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THE RELATION OF FORM AND MATTER IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM 
Introduction 
In this paper our aim has been to study Aristotle 
himself rather than what has been said about him. In 
accordance with this purpose we have gone directly to 
the primary sources, i.e., the writings of the Philoso-
pher. However, it has been but natural that we should 
refer to other writers for suggestion. We have come 
to believe that Leibniz furnishes the key to an adequate 
interpretation of the metaphysics of Aristotle. We 
find similar difficulties in Aristotle's 'unmoved-mover' 
and Leibniz's 'windowless monads' and we feel that the 
conception of an inrrnanent God is the only rational solu-
tion. The bibliography will indicate our indebtedness. 
We have attempted to substantiate our assertions about 
Aristotle's position by direct quotations from his work. 
Iore than this, we have tried to be fair to the general 
thought of his writings as a whole rather than to over-
estimate the value of ru1 isolated reference. Indeed, 
the findings are an outgrowth of the critical study of 
Aristotle. 
We are to consider the problem of Form and Hatter 
and their relations. It will not only add somewhat to 
the human interest of the paper but will also serve to 
furnish a background for his thought if we devote at 
least some spa~e to a brief sketch of the life of the 
2 
man whose ideas we ' are to consider • 
.Aristotle was born in 384 B.c. in the town o:r 
Stagira, the modern Stavro. His :rather, Nicomachus, be-
longed to the guild or the Asclepiadae and was physician 
and :rriend o:r Amyntas II o:r Iacedon. It is said that 
the members o:r thif? guild pr~cticed their sons in the 
art o:r dissection. It is highly probable that Aristotle 
was somewhat or an ·amateur physician. At any rate, he 
was accused by his enemies o:r being a 'quack' doctor. 
At the age or eighteen, the young Aristotle entered 
the school or Plato at Athens. Here he remained :ror 
twenty years until the death o:r his master. Plato 
evidently held his young student in high esteem. In 
rererring to Aristotle's home as "the house o:r the 
reader" he was no doubt paying the young student a mixed 
compliment. 'Yhile the older man disparaged mere book 
learning, he did recognize the ability or Aristotle. 
Upon the death o:r Plato and the accession or 
Speusippus to the headship or the school, Aristotle 
le:rt Athens in company with Xenocrates, a :rellow student. 
It may be conjectured that Aristotle was disappointed 
that he had not been selected by his master to continue 
the work or the school. Upon the invitation or Hermias, 
a rormer member of the A~ademy, he took up his residence 
at Assos, where he started a school. He married Pythias, 
the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias. At the end 
or three years, Aristotle moved to Mitylene, in the 
neighboring island of Lesbos. 
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In 343-2 Phi~ip o:r Macedon invited him to under-
take the education o:r the young Alexander, then thirteen 
years o:r age. In 340, when Alexander becrume regent :ror 
his :rather, Aristotle probably settled in Stagira. In 
335-4, soon a:rter the death o:r Philip, Aristotle re-
turned to Athens. , Xenocrates was at this time in charge 
o:r the Academy. This may have had sonething to do with 
Aristotle's decision to start a school o:r his own. As a 
:roreigner he could not own property, so he rented some 
buildings a short way out o:r the city. It was here that 
he collected probably some hundreds o:r manuscripts and 
: ... 
thus :rounded wl1at was the :f'irst o:r all great libraries. 
The school centered about the cult o:r the muses and was 
organized as a religious brotherhood. The system was 
somewhat similar to that o:r the colleges o:r Cambridge 
and Ox:rord with their deans and :rellows. 
On the death ·o:r Alexander in 323, Athens again be-
came the center o:r anti-Iacedonian :reeling. Aristotle, 
because o:r his relations with Alexander, was under sus-
picion. Charges were brought against him. Leaving 
Theophrastus in charge o:r the school, he withdrew to 
Chalcis. Here he died the :following year. 
While Aristotle di:r:rerecl in many ways :rrom his 
master, we have little reason to believe that there was 
any but the best o:r :reeling between them. Aristotle 
classes himself' as a Platonist when examining their be-
lie:rs. In some respects the tendency has been to enlarge 
upon the di:f':f'erences o:r these two philosophers. Aristotle, 
for pedagogical reasons we believe, was inclined at 
times to exagerate the difference. 
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The literary work of Aristotle may be divided in-
to three main sections. The first group consists of a 
more or less popular order and were published by him-
self• But a few quoted fragments have survived. The 
second group consists of memoranda and collections of 
material ror scientific treatises. The third group 
consists of the scientific works. These are thought 
to be the written lectures of Aristotle, either f'or de-
livery or record. Apart from the Athenaiofi Politeia, 
the whole existing body of his works belong to this 
third class. 
Before comming to our particular problem, there 
are a few preliminary matters to be consiclered. We 
must say a word about Aristotle's method. One is im-
pressed by his logical emphasis. His logical theory 
finds expression in his various worlcs. Second in im-
portance to this logical method of interpretation, is 
his empiricism. True, he has been criticised at this 
very point and some of his scientific theories, rather 
than being in advance of those of his contemporaries 
and predecessors, are regressions that seem almost lu-
dicrous to the modern mind. Though his empiricism may 
be def'ective, it is more than a step in the right direc-
tion. It naturally follows that his method is rationalis-
5 
tic. 
A. w. Benn characterizes Aristotle as an anatom-
izing, critical, descriptive, classificatory genius and 
asserts that he has all the virtues and vices that ac-
company this type. In rather a disparaging mood, he 
goes on to say that the most important conclusions of 
Aristotle are without positive or even educational value 
for us since they are almost entirely based upon false 
physical assumptions.. However, despite this criticism, 
Aristotle has had a profound influence upon the thought 
of the world. Many are debtor to him who Jmow it not. 
The very f'orm and mechanics of logic we owe to him. His 
ideas, regardless of the assumptions upon which they 
are based, have greatly influenced his successors. 
We have been able to discover three principal pre-
supposjtions in the system of Aristotle. The first is 
the necessity of cause. Closely associated with this 
in his thought is the denial of an infinite regress. 
The other presupposition essential for logic is the law 
of contradiction. He is consistent in the logical dev-
elopment of these fundamental presuppositions. They 
give rise to the central doctrine of his system, that 
of the four causes. An implication of' this doctrine is 
the idea of development which is one of the major meta-
physical contributions of Aristotle to the thought of 
the world. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that 
Windelband points out that Aristotle's philosophy is 
the system of develop~ent. He determined the true re-
ality as the essence which unfolds in the phenomena 
themselves. He renounced the attempt to think out as 
the cause of the phenomena something dif'f'erent f'rom 
them and tali.ght that the being of the thing which is 
lmown in conception possesses no other reality tl~ ::m the 
sum total of' the phenomena in which it realizes itself'. 
'fuile this is true in the main, there is danger or in-
tending too much by the statement and thus precluding 
the idea of God as necessary to an adequate interpreta-
tion of reality. Aristotle does have a place for God in 
his system although, at rirst reading, the Divine Being 
seems to dwell in a realm apart. Leibniz furnishes us 
with a valuable suggestion as to the method of reconcil-
ing the transcendent Unmoved-Mover with the system of 
development within the phenomena. 
The significant point is that Aristotle se0ks to 
understand the universal through the individual. The 
concrete is very real for him. 
every phase of' his philosophy. 
This is evidenced in 
Logically, it appears 
in the syllogism. In metaphysics it appears as the docm 
trine that reality is to be f'ound, not in the abstract 
universal, but in the merging or indeterminate matter in 
definite form. In psychology, soul is not some harmony 
or abstraction, but the truth or the body, body standing 
to soul as matter to form. In ethics, the aim is to 
realize our true human nature as members or society. 
Aristotle's analysis of' virtue is strikingly in-
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surricient. Virtue is a mean. It consists or the mod-
erate use or the dirrerent reelings and impulses or 
man's nature. Morality seems to be little more than 
respectability. ~Ian's true nature is to live a life or 
thought ror thought constitutes the individual soul. 
Pleasure is not to be identified with good. Although 
he regards insight as necessary ror right action, he 
recognizes it to be the province or the will to rollow 
right insight. The will has the power to do the wrong 
despite the right insight • . 
Since man is a social being, Aristotle does not 
consider politics as separate rrom ethics but as the 
completion or it in a true philosophy or humanity. Art 
is the realization in external form of a true idea. Po-
etry is conceived to be more philosophical than history 
because or its universalizing or particular events. 
Logic is preeminently the creation or Aristotle. 
The theory or the syllogism is based on the f'act that 
all thought rests on universal truths. Derinition is 
by means or the categories. He lists eight in one place 
and ten in another, nor do the lists fully agree. He 
tells us that there are rive statements that we can make 
about a thing; what the nam~ means, that the correspond-
ing thing is, what the thing is, that it has certain 
properties, why it has these properties. Both in the 
Analyt. Post. (7lb.9-12 , 94a.20) and in the Physica (184 
a.l0-14) he says that lrnowled.ge, to be truly scientific, 
must involve an insight into the causes or phenomena. 
' 
Aristotle treats Idtowledge as a development from sense 
impressions but recognizes that sense as such does not 
give us knowledge. 
We are considering in this paper Aristotle's cen-
tral doctrine of the Four Causes. We have already said 
that an implication of this doctrine is the idea of de-
velopment. We have seen that, for Aristotle, reality is 
round, not in the abstract universal, but in the merging 
of indeterminate matter in definite form. As we have 
already noted, to know a thing for Aristotle meant to 
know its cause. "Evidently there is a first principle," 
he tells us in the l\Ietaphysica (994a.1-21), 11 and the 
causes of things are neither an infinite series nor in-
finitely various in kind ••• If there is no first there 
is no cause at all ••• nor can there be an infinite series 
dOlmward ••• " Further on he adds," The process goes back 
to a certain starting point, but this no longer points 
to something further11 (1072b.11-13). "FUrther, the final 
cause is an end ••• the process will not be infinite" 
(994b.S-12). And then, as if to clinch the matter of 
infinite regress, he says, "But if the kinds of causes 
had been infinite in number, then also knowledge would 
have been impossible11 (994b.28). In the Analyt. Post. 
(94a.21-36, b·21-27) we find his statement of the four 
causes. The first is the material cause, or that out of 
which an object is created. The final cause is the end 
for which it is created. The formal cause is the expres-
sion o:r what the thing is while the e:r:ricient cause is 
the means by which the thing is created. It is evident 
that, according to our usage, only the e:r:ricient and 
:final are true causes. Aristotle is pres enting the log-
ical principles o:r explanation or de:rinition. 
This brie:r survey o:r Aristotle's thought leads us 
to our problem which is to discover the relationship 
that exists between these causes, more especially, be-
tween :rorm and matter. The question is, "Can the causes 
be reduced?" I:r so, what becomes o:r :rorm and ma.tter in 
the reduction? 
The Problem or Aristotle 
--- -- -------~~ 
Aristotle concerns himselr with the problem o:f 
being qua being which is his idea or rirst philosophy 
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or what we now term metaphysics. In dealing with this 
category or 'being' we shall rind it proritable to exam-
ine some or the concepts made use or by ristotle in 
his treatment. The rirst that we shall consider is that 
or substance or du .r~. Aristotle inrorms us that only 
substance is derinable (Yeta.1031a.1). It is the so 
called 'concrete' (1037a.29). Hence it is impossible 
that any universal term should be •the name or a substance 
(1038b.9, 1008a.7, 1053b.16, 1060b.21, 10nOa.26-30, 
1087a.2). He derines substance as "That which is not 
predicated or a subject, but or which all else is pred-
icated"(1038b.15). But he does not feel that this der-
inition is adequate for, according to it, matter would 
be substance. Substance is applied to rour main objects; 
the essence, the universal,the genus and the substratum 
(Meta.1028b.33). Again in Ietaphysica 1042a.27 he says 
that the substratw1 is substance, "and this is in one 
sense the matter and in another the rormula or rorm, and 
thirdly, the complex of matter and rorm, which alone is 
generated and destroyed, and is, without qualirication, 
capable or separate existence; ror of substance in the 
sense or rormula. some are separable and some are not." 
') / 
It is at once apparant that o v rLo.. is a relative term. 
Primarily it signi:fies that which simply is (not 'is 
something') according to the statement in . retaphysica 
11 
1028a.30. It is also considered as "a principle and a 
cause"(1041b.30, 1043a.2, 1041a.9). It is not an element 
but a principle, and the primary cause or a thing's be-
ing (1041b.27). Both the matter and 'form and compound 
or matter and 'form are said to be substance (1035a.t). 
Again he asserts that the 'form is the substance (essence) 
or the thing (1041b.9) and identi'fies substance with 
'form (1050b.2). In De Anima he presents the same idea. 
"Nolv there is one class or existent things which we call 
substance, including under the term, rirstly, matter, 
which in itselr is not this or that; secondly, shape or 
. 
'form (e~ oos · H 0 jJ o/7[) in virtue or which the term this or 
that is at once applied; thirdly, the whole made up or 
matter and rorm"(412a.9). He states it perhaps more 
clearly when he says that this ideal compound substance 
or essence is analysable into its abstract logical elem-
ents, 'form and matter (412b.7). When we read in De Anima 
(412a.7) as well as in the passages cited above, that 
matter is substance, we must not 'fail to realize, along 
lvith the relative character or substance, the relative 
nature or matter. "That bodies are substance" is in ac-
cord with his view or substance as "the whole made up o'f 
matter and 'form"(412a.t2). But his statement in De lnima 
412a.19 calls ror an explanation. "Soul is substance," 
he says,"in the sense that it is the 'form or a natural 
body having in it the capacity or lire." Or, as he 
) I / 
otherwise states it, "Soul is oven"- as 'Auy".s "(412b.10). 
Erdmann is quite right in drawing the distinction that 
12 
he does. He claims that the fact that Aristotle calls 
.) / . form o u tr Lc;.. is partly to be expla1ned by the higher po-
) / 
sition conceeded to form and also to the meaning of ov~t ~ 
as essentia as well as substantia. This is a fundamen-
tal distinction that we must not ignore. Erdmann adds 
) / 
that if ov d" 1 t... as a real substance be strictly adhered to, 
it must be conceived as the union of matter and form, 
and as it were composed of them as being materialized 
form or formed matter. Aristotle's position seems to be 
that the uniqueness of a thing, or its essence (or sub-
stance) consists, not in the form or matter taken sep-
ara tely, but rather, in the compound of matter and form 
or, better yet, in the realization of form in its partie-
ular matter. We do well to note this synoptic tendency. 
Form and matter are to be considered as substance only 
to the extent that they are the logical component parts 
of the concrete whole which has significance. This po-
sition is well substantiated by Aristotle's organic view 
of substance. "Substance is one ••• not by being a sort 
of unit or point; each is complete reality and a defin-
ite nature"(~.1044a.9). 
Under substance are classed the . following; the 
simple bodies and the things composed of them, both an-
i mals and divine things (all these being called substance 
because they are not predicated of a subject but every 
thing else is predicated of them); that which, being 
present in such things, are not predicated of a subject, 
is the cause or their being, as the soul or the being 
13 
or animals; the parts which are present in such things 
limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by 
whose destruction the whole is destroyed, and the essence, 
the rormula or which is a derinition. It has been stated 
above that the soul is the substance or a body having in 
it the capacity or lire. This must be interpreted in 
the light or a rurther statement that "The soul is the 
J / 
rirst actuality (6~ 1~A~XGt ~) or a natural body having 
in it the capacity or lire"(De Anima 412a.27). This is 
very signiricant and relevant to the position that we 
take. It supports the contention that it is rorm as 
realized or the entelechy that Aristotle intends us to 
consider as true substance. 
We have shown that there are two senses in which 
substance may be used. The rirst is the ultimate sub-
stratum which is no longer predicated or anything else, 
and the other as that which is a 'this' and separable, 
and or this nature is the shape and rorm or each thing 
( feta.1017b.10-28). We have seen that Aristotle recog-
nizes incorporeal as well as corporeal substances. But 
we must remember that incorporeal substance is not to 
be taken as or the nature or reeling or state or con-
sciousness but rather the general qualities or assem-
blages or qualities which remain constant amid the rluc-
tuations or sensible phenomena. Berore leaving sub-
stance, it remains to be said that this concept is to 
be interpreted in the light or Aristotle's insistence 
upon the primacy or the concrete along with his view 
14 
of' substance as an organic unity. We are not to think 
that Aristotle breaks substance up into component real 
parts. It is only by means of' a logical abstraction 
that we are able to arive at such conceptions as f'orm 
and matter. But this will be brought out more clearly 
as we proceed with our study. 
rl 
The term matter (vA~) is used by Aristotle in 
f'our principal senses. First, it is the substratum of' 
varying determinations; second, it is the potential 
which has implicitly the capacity to develope into the 
real; third, it is the f'ormle s s and so indeterminate 
and contingent; and f'ourth, as that which is without 
any def'inite f'orm, it is almost synonomous with nega-
tion. It is a relative term and in its last phase is 
identical with f'orm. The concept 'matter' must not be 
understood as meaning f'or Aristotle what it has come to 
mean in popular thought or even in philosophy. "By 
matter I mean that which in itself' is neither a partie-
ular thing nor of' a certain quantity nor assigned to 
any other of' the categories by which being is deter-
mined"( teta.1029a.20). This will explain Aristotle's 
dissatisf'action with the def'inition of' 'substance' he 
put f'orward in Metaphysica 103Sb.15 which would include 
within its meaning 'matter', which is not a particular, 
and 'substance', which is a particular or concrete. 
Matter is unknowable in itself' (Meta.1036a.S) and is 
indef'inite (1037a.27). But matter may acquire indiv-
15 
iduality and be perceived. It is then that we call it 
substance (1070a.10). It is in this sense that matter 
is identi:f'ied with substance by Aristotle. Materia 
prima can be known only by analogy, we are told in the 
Physica (191a.s). In De Anima (412a.9) we find the 
statement that matter is identified with potentiality. 
This is a very important element in the system o:r Aris-
totle and also the most de:f'inite statement that he makes 
in regard to the nature o:r matter. (See also 414a.16.) 
In the Metaphysica he says that "Matter exists in a po-
tential state just because it may attain to its rorm; 
and when it exists actually, then it is in its :rorm" 
(1050a.15). This is not as strong a statement as the 
other but it indicates that, ror Aristotle, matter is a 
logical abstraction possessing only potential reality, 
capable or realization only by receiving form. Thus it 
is that matter is the indeterminate (Meta.1007b.28). 
But materia ultima or materia rormata is identiried with 
form (De Anima 414a.25, Physica 194b.8, 1Ieta.1045b.17). 
The potential has become the actual in realizing its 
form. 
Following out the idea or matter as potentiality, 
Aristotle goes on to say, "Now all things that change 
have matter, but di:f':f'erent matter; and of eternal things, 
those which are not generable but are moveable in space 
have matter"( 1eta.1069b.25, 1042b.6). It is rnther in-
teresting, in drawing our attention to the purely logical 
nature or the concept 'matter', to read, "It is not nee-
16 
essary if' a thing has matter f'or change of' place that it 
also have matter f'or generation and destruction"(1042b. 
6). Adding an emphasis to his f'ormer statement, he re-
marks, "Nor has everything matter but only those things 
which come to be and change into one another. Those 
things without ever being in course of' changing, are or 
are not, have no matter"(1044b.27). That which is per-
f'ect actuality and inunovable is without matter or poten-
tiality. It f'ollows then, that sensible substances 
have matter (1042a.25). But it does not f'ollow f'rom 
this that matter per ~ is substance. Along the same 
line is his statement that "All things produced by na-
ture or by art have matter; f'or each of' them is c apable 
of' being and not being, and this capacity is the matter 
in each" (l0:eta.1032a. 20). 
The superiority of' f'orm over matter is brought out 
very clearly in many places in Aristotle. Not only in 
n etaphysica (1029a.5) but in Physica (192a.13) and also 
in De Gener. Animalium (729a.10) and in De Partibus 
Animalium (640b.28). 
As we have already sholm, matter is mere potenti-
ality. Without the f'orm it is indeterr.~.inate. The analys-
is of' the concrete particular or substance or ens is 
1' 
sometimes into matter and f'ort:t (c-lJos /{c..( f{~ ~~ ) , some-
times into matter and notion ('Au(6S K'-'; fl(lt f1>• (In 
this connection compare De Anima 412a.8 and .retaphysica 
1042a.28). Form embraces a variety of' meanings, some-
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times as sensible shape (/f {Jff? ) , quite o:ften as the ob-
ject o:f thought or the inner nature o:f a thing (ff[<:[Gs ) . 
Again we :find it as the :formula or de:fini tion ( A ;("S ) and 
\ I 1 ,. 
then as the essence (T" T' '>]v 6-t v c...'- ) • These are all used 
., 
sybonymously :for ~'-ous • 
'Vhile matter has been identi:fied with potentiality 
( J ~v c..H's) :form has been identi:fied with actuality 
' / ( <:-v-r~~ c~,X <:- '"'). Strictly speaking, it is the :formed matter 
that is the entelechy rather than the :form . Despite 
the superiority o:f :form, it must be realized in matter, 
and matter o:f a particular kind, i:f it is to be (De An-
ina 403b . 1, Phys . 209a.21, Ieta . 1044b.12) . Thus even 
:form may be said to be in a sense potential. This is 
brought out in a statement in De Anima where he says, 
"This soul is a place o:f (:forms or) ideas: except that 
this is not true o:f the lvhole soul, but only o:f the 
1' 
soul which thinl{s, and again that the :forms (&ld "S) arc 
not in actuality, but potentially"(42Da . 25) . This does 
not add to the superiority o:f :form over matter! 
Aristotle holds that :form is neither generated nor 
destroyed (Jeta.1043b.17). latter and the substratum 
share this eternity with the :form (Heta . 1034b . 12, Phys. 
I . 9) . From Plato Aristotle Derived the idea that there 
are as many :forms as particular things ( .reta . 1070a . 26) . 
In the Physica (191b . 29) Aristotle adds to :form and 
matter a third principle of explanation based upon his 
theory o:f contradictories. Thus we have :form, matter and 
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privation. The primary contrariety is, as he tells us, 
that betveen positive state and privation ( Ieta.1055a.~3). 
He illustrates this fact by the use of wine, vinegar 
and water as examples. According to Aristotle, priva-
/ 
tion ( v '~/?c,.s) is the denial of a predicate to a deter-
minate genus (1011b.18). Thus water, not vinegar, is 
the privation of wine. He says that in the list o~ con-
traries one of the two columns i s privation, and all con-
traries are reduced to being and non-being and to unity 
and plurality (1004b.27). "If privation is in a sense 
'having' or 'habit' everything will be capable by having 
something, so that things are capable both by having a 
positive principle and by having the privation of the 
positive principle, if it is possible to have B ~riva­
tion"(Meta.1019b.7). 
A far more fruitful concept seems to be that of 
potentiality (J'~ v "fA's ) • Ve quote Aristotle's own words. 
"And I mean by potency not only that definite kind which 
is said to be a principle of change in another thing or 
in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general, 
every principle of movement or rest ••• To all such po-
tency, then, actuality is prior both in formula and 
substance" (Meta.1069b .15). And in the De Anir:m the same 
thought is suggested. "For the actuality or each thing 
comes naturally to be developed in the potentiality of 
each thing ••• in the appropriate matter (414a.26). This 
contrast between the potential and the actual is found 
in De Interpret. where he says, "Some things, like the 
celestial substances, are actualities without possibil-
....................... __________________ __ 
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in De Interpret. where he says, "Some things, like the 
celestial substances, are actualities without possibil-
ity (or potentiality); others (the generated and perish-
able substances) which are prior in nature but posteri-
or in generation, are actualities along with possibility; 
while a third class are possibilities only and never 
come into being"(23a . 21). At rirst reading this may 
seem like a contradiction or terms but Aristotle's 
meaning is quite evident . That which is rully realized 
can not be said to be possible . It is beyond the stage 
or mere possibility . In the ideal realm there are pos-
sibilities (or potentialities) that are never reali~ ed. 
In the .Ietaphysica he says that that 'IVhich is capable 
or being may either be or not be (1050b . 11). That is, 
possibility means possible to be and possible not to be. 
The statement that "No eternal thing exists potentially" 
( 1eta.1050b . S) explains the quotation rrom De Interpret. 
as does also the similar statement, " Nor does eternal 
movement, if there be such, exist potentially" (10 Ob.19) . 
That which is eternal, whether motion or being, has not 
the possibility or not being. Had it this potentiality, 
it would not be eternal, ror it might pass out or being. 
This seems to be the point that Aristotle aims to make . 
In Topica (138b . 28) we come across the rather commonplace 
statement to the errect that no potentiality whatever 
can belong to non- being. This has a signiricant bear-
ing on the concept 'matter '. 
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Most authorities consulted claim that there is 
) / J / 
slight if any difference between t-'l.JT~A ~{~''1 and €-v e-;a/ E-' "'-
and that Aristotle uses them s.monymously for realiza-
tion of possibility. One writer, Thos. Taylor, in his 
Dissertation~ the Philosophy of Aristotle (p.05) sug-
gests that perhaps entelechy is used as significant of 
perfection. With this we are·1enclined to agree. This 
is h3rdly an important point, however. What is signif-
icant is Aristotle's statement that "There must be a prin-
ciple whose very essence is actuality"{ eta.1071b.19). 
Here we have an expression of his idea of development. 
"The action is the end and the actuality is the action. 
Therefore even the word 'actuality' is derived from 
action and points to a complete reality"(1050a.23). What 
I 
he is here describing is tl e movement (X 1 ">' & 61•) from 
the possible to . the actual or from potentiality to en-
telechy. The move1ent is the perfecting rinciple. In 
explaining this movement he makes use of the logical 
abstractions of form and matter which we have considered 
above:. 
As we have already shmm, the process of develop-
ment presents itself to Aristotle as the relation of 
form (efc".s )!of<; f ) and matter. Matter, as we have been 
i nformed, is the indeterminate, a corporeal substratum 
The matter, or corporeal substratum, is 
the possibility of that which, in the complete thing, 
has become actual or real by means of the form ( leta • 
.) I 
1050a.15). In matter, the essential nature (ov~/'1) is 
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given only potentially (~~vqk~L ). Only by means of the 
I I 
form does it exist in reality or actuality (&vc::;t~'4 ). 
In the case of artistic construction, the material '\Vhich 
contains possibility exists by itself (but still formed) 
while in the case of organic processes matter and form 
are the two sides of the same reality, identical from 
beginning to end. 
Aristotle holds that in nature as opposed to art, 
there is an impulse to movenent within. It is interest-
ing to note the S8rue thought in Leibniz. In the Monacl-
ology we read that change is due to an internal princi-
ple (prop.ll) and the action of the internal principle 
may be called appetition (prop.15). We shall "find that 
Leibniz has carried many of the rundamental ideas of 
Aristotle to their logical conclusion. But to return 
to our internal principle, it is difficult to say just 
with what Aristotle associates it. The commonly accepted 
view identifies it with form and Aristotle offers much 
to substantiate this position. However, sonething may 
be said in behalf' of matter. Aristotle reminds us that 
form must be realized in its appropriate matter. But 
how significnnt is this statement? 
Thomas Aquinas presents the traditional view. In 
the Summa Contra Gent. (p.38) we read that " ratter does 
not become the cause of any actual thing, except by be-
ing altered or changed. Matter is not a principle of ac-
tivity: wherefore, as the Philosopher puts it, efficient 
and material causes do not coincide." Leibniz seems to 
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be inclined to somewhat the same view. "Si la puissance 
respond au latin potentia, elle est opposee a l'acte: 
et le passage de la puissance a 1 1 acte est le changement. 
c'est ce qu' Aristote entend par le mot de mouvement ••• " 
(Nouveaux_ Essais ~ l'entenment Humain, II,xxi,l). 
Aquinas naturally interprets Aristotle in the light of' 
his own dualistic conception of' reality. He apparently 
misunderstands the Aristotelian concept 'matter' and 
like other Scholastics and their :followers, is guilty 
of an injustice to the Philosopher in hypost~tizing this 
term. It would seem that Aristotle is quite explicit in 
his statement that "By matter I mean that which in it-
self is neither a particular thing nor o:f a certain qual-
ity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which 
being is determined"( ieta.1029a.20). Aristotle does 
say that the only c~use is not material (Meta.983b.27). 
In the same connection he says that the material cause 
is not the ef:ficient cause. But he definitely states 
that "even the matter is a motive principle"(1046a.23). 
It will be well to give the f'ull quotation. ''Obviously, 
then, in a sense the potency of acting and bein~ acted 
on is one (for a thing may be capable either because it 
can be acted on or because something else can be acted 
on by it), but in a sense the potencies are di:f:ferent. 
For the one is in the thing acted on: it is lecause it 
contains a certain motive principle, and because even 
the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted 
on is acted on, one thing by one, another by another, 
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ror that which is oily is inrlammable, and that which 
yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly 
in all other cases." 
Aristotle, it would appear, inrers that the denial 
that matter is a motive principle demands the conclusion 
that mnterial and erricient cause are not the same. Log-
ically, we have a right to assume that his admission 
that matter, in a sense, is a motive principle, permits 
us to assert that efficient and material c~uses may be 
similar if not the s~me. At least the admission in one 
place negates the force or the denial in the other. The 
significant question is, "Is it possible that the poten-
tiality or matter is mere passivity?" In the light o~ 
what has just been said it is indeed difficult to come 
to such a conclusion. We must leave this point for the 
present and continue our consideration or activity. 
Aristotle recognizes that motion or activity is 
used in two senses. "For motion", he informs us,"is the 
activity or that which is imperfect; but activity in 
the absolute sense, i.e., activity or that which has 
reached perfection, is quite distinct"(De Anima 431a.6~ 
Thus there is the ac ti vi ty that the eternal beinr; has, 
such as thought or contemplation. But the eternal be-
ing can not be moveable. He goes on to say that move-
ment must always have existed and must be continuous 
(~Ieta.1071b.6). But movement does not imply a void 
(Phys.214a.22). In De Anima he says that the raculty 
or appetency, as such, and ultimately the object or 
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appetency are moving causes . The object of appetency 
without being in motion itselr , causes motion by the 
mere fact of being thought or imagined (433b . 10). Sim-
ilarly we read in the Metaphysic s that there is a mover 
that moves without being moved, being eternal substance 
' 
and actuality ( f:Vcf{ f- 1 "-); and the object or desire and 
the object of thought move in this way; they move with-
out being moved (1072a . 23). We may add the statenent 
that the final cause produces motion by being desired 
(1072b . 4) . It seems rather rantastic to read that 
there is a separate motive agent or intelligence for 
each sphere ( Ieta . 1073a.2P-b.1, De Caelo 279a.18f). 
These, however, are dependent upon the final cause or 
unmoved mover. 
The ideas of motion and or development made use or 
by Aristotle, which we have just reviewed, lead us to 
consider briefly the evolutionary tendencies of the Phil-
osopher . Henry Fairfield Osborn, in his From the Greeks 
to Darwin discovers marked tendencies in this direction. 
It would seem that Osborn is reading into Aristotle 
the ideas or a more modern period. Empedocles' theory 
of strife and chaos ordered by love might well be in-
terpreted in the light or an evolutionary hypothesis, 
but Aristotle rejects this view of his predecessor. Ac-
cording to Osborn, Aristotle understood adaptation and 
recognized a chain rrom polyps to man or a 'genetic ser-
ies ' as well as a complete gr8dation in nature. 
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Osborn admits that Aristotle is guilty or holding that 
not only smaller but larger animals, such as rrogs, 
snakes, eels, were spontaneously produced rrom mud. 
Osborn does not seem to realize how damaging this is to 
his contention. As he also adnlits, Aristotle rejects 
the theory or adaptation in ravor or his theory or a 
perrecting principle. Aristotle relt that the admission 
or such a theory or survival would destroy his theory. 
A rending of the History ~ Animals rails to reveal any 
marked evolutionary tendencies in the sense that we now 
understand evolution . The strongest statement that 
Osborn quotes is this, "H'ttrther still, it is necessary 
that the germ should have been produced rirst and not 
immediately animals : and the sort mass that rirst sub-
sisted was the gern." 
the primordeal matter. 
Osborn interprets this mass as 
But by the side or Osborn's in-
terpretation should be taken a statement from Metaphysica. 
"For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior 
and complete, and the first thing is not seed but com-
plete being"(1072b . 35) . Another relevant statement 
from the same treatise is interesting in this connec-
tion. "To all such potency then, actuality is prior in 
formula and substance ." But more to the point is this: 
"For from the potential the actual is always produced 
by an actual being, e . g . , man by man"(Ieta.1049b . 10- 35). 
And in this same connection we must remember that "the 
essence is not produced"(1033b . 5) . There is for Aristotle, 
as we hav~ already seen, a principle at wort that tends 
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toward the per:fecting o:f being. an might become a better 
man or come to a :fUller realization o:f the :form or notion 
or idea o:f man but he would remain man. The species are 
sharply de:fined. The mere :fact o:f gradation does not 
imply a process o:f evolution. Had he an evolutionary 
hypothesis in mind, it would seem strange that Aristotle 
clid not de:fini tely call attention to it when he points 
out the similarity and dif:ferences o:f the species in his 
History o:f Animals. It must be admitted, however, that 
there is much in Aristotle's system that might well :form 
the basis o:f an evolutionary theory. It is doubt:fUl if 
he expected his doctrine to be so interpreted. Devel-
opment seems to express his idea more truly than does 
evolution. Perhaps the chie:f reason :for this assertion 
is that Aristotle o:f:fers a satisfactory logical explana-
tion o:f reality. Chronologically he is not so success• 
:fUl. In dealing with the temporal realm he :fails to 
get away :from the in:finite regress so abhorrent to him. 
In time there is always an antecedent cause. This is 
unavoidable. Aristotle seems to start with the concrete 
world as existing, and not with any form of nebuln hy-
pothesis. For him, the world 'is'. He attempts to ex-
plain it on the basis o:f his :four principles or causes. 
While, in one sense, the logical, there is motion and 
development, in anotl1er, the temporal, everything is 
static or :fixed in the ever present eternity. 
The universe is sustHined rather than created by 
Aristotle's unmoved mover. This position is in harmony 
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with the conception of' an immanent God who continuously 
exercises his creative activity. Aristotle's system 
does not preclude evolution but it would quali-fy any 
evolutionary theory that we might hold. It is signif'-
icant in this connection that the actuality preceeds 
the potential. The f'inished product is logically f'irst. 
Thus it f'ollows that any process of' evolution must be 
directed by the notion, f'orm or idea of' the Final cause 
or end. Evolution would f'ollow intelligence and would 
work toward a preconceived end. At this point Leibniz 
is helpf'ul as we attempt to interpret the Philosopher. 
As we have noted above, the action of' the internal 
principle may be called 'appetition'. The source of' 
this motive principle is thus the Final Cause or un-
moved I wver. 
Benn claims that Aristotle f'ails to distinguish 
between unif'orm causation and design. The unbrol{en 
regularity of' celestial movement is a proo:r of' mech-
anism f'or Benn while it argues purpose f'or Aristotle. 
nenn points out that the teleology of' Aristotle is a 
teleology that a positivist might hold. Aristotle does 
allow f'or chance, however, and also the accidental (leta. 
1072a.13). It is signif'icant that Aristotle does not 
argue f'rom evidence of' design in nature to the operation 
of' ~ .designing intelligence in the world at large. Nor 
is it clear that he intends to imply that natural bodies 
subserve an end outside themselves. This is an import-
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an t point and p e rplexing. Ofir consideration of the evo-
lutionary tendencies in Aristotle leads us to the con-
viction that, while he does not argue from the evidence 
of design in nature to the worlcing of a designing in-
telligence outside her, such a step is the logical im-
pli.cation of his system . Without it his system would 
not be consistent . u. D. Ross calls attention to a pas-
sage in book IV of the .Ietereolot;ica to the effect 
that tissues, no less than organs, though less obviously, 
are what t1ey are by virtue not I erely of having certain 
certain material qualities but also of perforning cer-
tain functions in the organism. "The way is thus pre-
pared for the teleological treatment of the living 
body in the De Partibus AniPJ~lium which is evidently 
intended to be studied next," remarks this writer in 
his Aristotle. It is evident that, for Aristotle, ex-
planation would be incoJTiplete without a knowledge of 
purpose . "For nature like intelligence acts for a pur-
pose and this purpose is for it an encl" (De Anima 415b .15). 
Ve must admit that hristotle ' s tre~tment of pur-
pose does not go as far as we would wish . He is content 
to present the evidence and it spells purpose. He does 
not definitely point out the ultimate origin of this 
purpose. It is strange that, while he recognizes pur-
pose as one of the four causes and gives to it such an 
important place in his syste '1 of explanation, he does 
not definitely linlc up purpose within the individual 
or within nature with the great world purpose. Indeed 
there seems to be a weakness at this point . It is a 
weakness that is due to his ethical theory . 
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Instead of 1 taking the connection between the Tt'inal 
Cause and the individual by way of' purpose , he uses the 
concept 'motion ' or ' activity ' and postulates the unmoved 
mover as the source of' all motion . It must be confessed 
that, on the surface at least, this seems to be a mech-
anistic interpretation . But the aspect is change~ when 
he says that the unmoved mover c~uses motion by being 
desired . This tends toward a personalistic interpreta-
tion . While Aristotle does not say it e xplicitly , he 
leaves it to us to draw the conclusion that the Final 
Cause furnishes the purpose. 
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Relation or the ~ Causes 
We now come to the problem of the relation or the 
four causes in Aristotle. Concerning these rour causes, 
he says that the rinal cause or end is prior in the order 
of nature but posterior to the terms of the conclusion 
in the order or time or generation: while the erficient 
is prior in the order of time or generation. The formal 
and material are simultaneous with the efrect (Analyt. 
Post.94b.21). For Aristotle the form is the plan or 
structure considered as informing a particular product 
or nature or art. The rinal cause is the same plan con-
sidered as not yet embodied in the particular thing but 
as aimed at by nature or art. This formal-final cause 
we discover to be the efficient cause considered from 
yet another angle. In nature, the form which is to find 
embodiment is already present and is the cause of the 
movement. Aristotle clearly identiries the formal and 
final causes in this quotation: "The material cause is 
that which makes generation possible ••• The formal, and 
at the same time final, cause is the rormula expressing 
the essential nature of the thing that comes to be"(De 
Gen. et Corr. 336b. 2f). In the De Anima lve have an un-
mistakable statement that embraces the three causes. 
"For the soul is the cause of animate bodies as being in 
itselr the origin of motion, as final cause, and as sub-
stance (essence). Clearly it is so as substance, substance 
being the cause of all existence. And for living things, 
existence means life. FUrthermore, actuality is the no-
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tion (rorm) or that which has potential existence. Man-
irestly too, the soul is the rinal cause. For nature, 
lilce intelligence, acts ror a purpose and this purpose 
is ror it an end11 (415b.15). 
We thus rind that Aristotle himselr reduces the 
rour causes to two and we are lert with the dualism or 
matter, which makes the reality possible, on the one 
side and the rormal-einal-erricient cause on the other. 
The question naturally arises, "Is this dualism rinal 
or can it be subjected to rurther reduction?" In the 
event or a reduction we are interested to know what the 
result will be. As long as we consider matter as a mere 
passive potentiality the dualism is apt to persist. But 
when 1ve come to consider that even matter is in a sense 
a motive principle, the dualistic interpretation is not 
so secure. Taking Aristotle's doctrine or development 
as central, there is a sense in which the dualism is not 
objectionable. Stated thus the dualism merely expresses 
the process or development rrom the possible to the ac-
tual. In the light or this principle the concepts 'rorm' 
and 'matter' seem to be equivalent to the logical asser-
tion that a certain idea, notion, shape or rorm, is cap-
able or being. To state it perhaps more precisely, we 
might say that a certain rorm is capable or realization 
in a particular way. It is perhaps more orten stated 
conversely and is apt to give the impression that mat-
ter is something substantial. The logical rorce is not 
quite so selr-cvident when we assert that matter may 
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receive f'orm. 
In f'acing the question as to the relation of' the 
material to the other causes we must be clear in our 
understanding of' this concept 'matter'. We have already 
noted a tendency upon the part of' the interpreters to 
consider it as an entity by itself'. Perhaps Aristotle 
should share in the responsibility f'or this f'or he does 
not always clearly dif'f'erentiate between prime matter 
and proximate matter. In spite of' his preciee statement 
regarding (prime) matter, the Scholastic commentators 
seem to conf'Use prime matter and proximate matter. 
We have seen that the empiricism of' Aristotle 
evidences itself' in the conception of' the concrete as 
the real. It is doubtless due to this tendency that he 
does not always clearly distinguish between pure and 
proximate matter. Thus it may be argued that while he 
does speak of' pure matter, proximate matter, or matter 
in its present day popular signif'ication lias more im-
portant in his system. It was more immediate . It was 
knowable. As we have already noted, pure matter f'or 
him was largely a logical concept. Proximate matter 
bas more reality or rather actuality in that it is f'ormed. 
Yet we cannot escape being driven back f'inally to the 
pure matter. In this connection we read, "Regarding 
material substance, we must not f'orget that even if' all 
things come f'rom the same things f'or their f'irst causes 
and if' the same matter serves as the starting point f'or 
their generation, yet there is a matter proper to each ••• 
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though perh~ps these come f'rom the same original matter" 
( Ieta.1044a.15). We must note the distinction that he 
makes here between the proper proximate matter as a meta-
physical entity and the pure matter which is the logical 
concept. 'Vhile Aristotle is not dogmatic at this point, 
he seems inclined to the view that the same matter un-
derlies all. The real inplication of' the passage quoted 
seems to be that the material cause is not the only 
cause although it is probable that all things ultimately 
have the same logical ground of' being or cause. Here we 
see the empiricist and rationalist at work as he seeks 
to interpret reality. 
As potentiality and as a motive principle it would 
seem that matter might be included in the reduction of' 
causes. Aristotle shows how any one of' the f'our causes 
may f'Unction as the middle term of' the syllogism. Mater-
ial cause here has a somewhat dif'f'erent meaning than 
usual with Aristotle, 'the condition f'rom which it f'ol-
lows that a thing is.' In the Posterior Analytics we 
have the narrower conception f'rom which the notion of' 
material f'orm was later reached by the recognition of' an 
analogy between the relation of' premises to conclusion 
and that of' matter to f'ormed thing. The f'or~s of' Aris-
totle, combining as they do the notion of' definition 
and that of' a moving cause and a f'Ulf'illed purpose, are 
evidently derived f'rom the Platonic Ideas. Aristotle 
agrees with the Platonists that general conceptions are 
the sole objects of' knowledge but he dif'f'ers f'rom them 
........... -------------------------
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in that he maintains that such conceptions have no exis-
tence apart f'rom the particulars in which they reside. 
As we have noted above, real substance or being is not 
the abstract universal but the concrete individual thing 
(Meta . 1037a.29) . J I So regarded, being (ouCt4) takes the 
( \ _, "J' T ) character of' the essence ~ T t ~v GLv~~ which consti-
tutes the only ground of' its individual formations, but 
is real or actual only in these themselves and all phen-
omenal appearance or co~ning into being becomes the re-
alization of' the essence (1032b.l). 
We have found in our study that while matter is 
not an entity, it is not absolutely non-existent, f'or it 
I 
exists as potentiality or capacity ( Juv~Mts) and non-
being can not have potentiality (1Ieta.412a.9). Form, 
on the other hand, is said to be the accomplishment or 
actuality. Yet this does not seem to be intended f'or ~. 
precise statement. It contains certain inconsistencies. 
It implies not only the disappearance of' matter or its 
entire absorption by f'orm, despite the ~act that it can 
not be destroyed, but also the survival of' :rorm. Now 
shall we say that matter is formed or is :rorm? Logically 
a thing may be and yet be possible, as Aristotle points 
out, for possible means possible to not be as well as 
possible to be. Then another point in this connection 
is that Aristotle says that the product (of :ror~ , pri-
vation and matter) must be different from these elements 
(Meta.1070b.16). Thus it will be seen that the entelechy 
will be different :rrom its form and matter and, strictly 
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speaking, will not be either but the concrete. We 
should not ignore the ract that the primacy or the in-
dividual substance is one or the most fixed points in 
Aristotle. It is the point at which he most clearly 
diverges rrom Plato's doctrine. 
We must not rail to note that even the rorms may 
have a potential existence. We have seen that ideas may 
exist in the mind potentially according to Aristotle. 
But concerning rorms in general we may ask, are all 
possible rorms realized? Ir not, we raise the rurther 
question, what is the status or such unrealized forms, 
ror neither matter nor rorm can be generated nor de-
stroyed? In the case or matter it may be said that it 
always has a rorm minimum. But it would be a contra-
diction or terms to say that every rorm was embodied 
in a minimum or matter. Forms must be round in the re-
alization or the concrete or else some other ground or 
their reality must be postulated. In the case or eternal 
beings we have pure rorm in the sense that such beings 
were never mere potentiality. They are thererore im-
material substance. 
We rind it exceedingly dirricult to divorce rorm 
and matter. Such a step is bound to lead to logical 
difficulties and inconsistencies. We have already dis-
covered a problem in the unrealized but possible forms. 
Along with the question as to the ground or reality or 
these unrealized rorms, we may ask another. "What is the 
ultimate origin or the potentiality or motive principle 
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of matter?" We have seen that the rormal cause may serve 
as end or final cause. This suggests a possible answer 
to our problem. But Aristotle himself has a word to 
add that will aid in the solution. "People look ror a 
unifying rormula and a dirference between potency and 
complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate 
matter and the rorm are one and the same thing , the one 
p otentially, the other actually"(Meta.1045b.16 ). This 
is in perrect harmony with his organic view of reality. 
It is also the nearest to a definite statement that he 
makes regarding the relation of the material and the 
formal causes. At this point we ought to malce one point 
clear. We are not to understand that in every instance 
the formal, rinal and efricient causes will be round to 
be one and the same. For this reason we are not to ex-
pect that the material cause, ir it becomes a part or 
the reduction at all, will always be identiried with the 
other causes. Aristotle distinctly says in the Physica 
that material and efficient causes do not coincide. It 
is evident that we should have a logical absurdity ir 
they did. But while the mere possibility may not cause 
the actual (as efricient cause) yet it is found to be the 
same as the actual. As Aristotle himself expresses it, 
it is the other side of the same reality. 
Apparently Aristotle did not see the necessity of 
carrying the thought any fUrther in this direction. We 
are left to draw our mm conclusions regarding the in-
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elusion of' the ma.terial cause in the reduction of' the 
other causes. It would seem that we are doing no vio-
lence to Aristotle's system when we say that it is log-
ically possible to reduce the f'our causes to one. In 
f'act, in so doing certain dif'f'iculties are oversome. We 
have already seen that the one cause can not be material. 
In other words, the potential is not the starting point. 
Being does not come f'rom non-being. Actuality preceeds 
potentiality. What then is the resultant cause? Aris-
totle answers this question f'or us. In the previous 
reduction, the f'ormal cause has stood out. The f'orm, 
notion, idea, is the end in view or the f'inal cause, be-
ing present it is also the ef'f'icient cause. But how 
can the material cause be the f'ormal cause other than 
by saying with Aristotle that it is the other side of' 
the same reality, or the possibility of' the idea being 
realized? 
We shall attempt another appro::tch to the problem. 
Our line of' argument f'rom this point will be more Leib-
nizian than Aristotelian, we must conf'ess, yet the im-
plications are clearly to be f'ound in Aristotle. In 
the Monadology we read that God is the source of' what-
ever is real in the possible. "For it must needs be that 
if' there is any reality in essences or in possibilities 
or indeed in the eternal truths, this reality is based 
upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, 
in the existence of' the necessary Being in whom essence 
includes existence or in whom possibility is suf'f'icient 
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to produce actuality"(Prop.43,44). Aristotle's doctrine 
of motion or actuality, as he shows us, implies the un-
moved mover or Final Cause as the source of all activity. 
It is this unmoved mover that makes all being possible. 
We may say that this final cause is the condition from 
which it follows that the thing is. In other words, 
logically, the final cause becomes the material cause 
of the concrete particulars. As, by Aristotle's system, 
the universal must be known through expression in the 
particulars, so the eternal First and Final Cause, we 
may argue, is knowable only through expression in the 
concrete finite. The eternal substance is immaterial 
since it is the all embracing reality an, hence not po-
tential. However, it is the possibility of its finite 
manifestations and thus the material cause of all that 
is. This seems to be the logical implication of Aristo-
tle's system, however, he has not worked it out himself 
in this fashion. 
It must be pointed out that Aristotle's mere sug-
gestion, in a passage quoted above, of the possibility 
• of all things not coming from the same matter weakens 
our position and certainly does not add to the strength 
or consistency of his system. However, it is quite ev-
ident that he was inclined to the view that the same 
matter underlies all. We may so read the passage in 
question so as to avoid the difficulty. We might sub-
stitute the words "despite the fact" in place of "even 
if" and do no injustice to his position. Our quotation 
would then read,"Despite the :fact that all things come 
:from the same things :for their :first causes and the 
same matter serves as a starting point :for their gen-
eration, yet there is a matter proper to each." How-
ever, we must recognize the :fact that .1\ristotle speaks 
with less dogmatism and his hesitancy may be signi:fi-
cant. At least it indicates that the empiricist takes 
precedence over the speculator. In this instance there 
is no need or con:flict. 
We have considered the relation o:f "form and matter 
and have seen that, in a sense, Aristotle considered 
them as the two sides o:f the sru"'e reality. We have been 
impressed with his logical emphasis in the interpreta-
tion of' being. We do not know that we have entirely 
succeeded in reducing the four causes to one. Such a 
reduction would simply mean that the same cause acted 
in a fourf'old manner . We have shown how it is possible 
to consider Aristotle's Final Cause as the First Cause 
or ground of all reality. We must candidly admit that 
there may be a question as to whether Aristotle intended 
such an interpretation. It is of course possible that 
he held an entirely different view. The material cause 
considered as "the condition from which it follows that 
the thing is" may indicate a factor entirely dif'f'erent 
from the Final Cause . Reality may be conceived as co-
existing with the unmoved mover, dependent upon the 
Final Cause for motion but independent of this cause 
as concerning its existence. ratter and "form, being 
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neither generated nor destroyed, would not be dependent 
upon the Final Cause. Following this line of argument, 
it is the phenomenal reality, or in Aristotelian terms, 
"that which changes, cones into being and is destroyed", 
i.e., the concrete, that depends upon the Final Cause 
for existence. This view gives to matter an independence 
tl1at seems at variance with Aristotle's thought. As we 
insisted above, there must be some ground of reality of 
the form. The view just suggested would contain incon-
sistencies that would prove destructive. 
The vital question, however, is not whether form 
and matter may be reduced to one. Of course we must re-
cognize that there must be four causes, no more and no 
less. The real significance of our problem is twofold. 
First, is reality to be interpreted upon the basis of 
a dualistic philosophy and second, if not, what is the 
nature of ultimate reality? If we are supert'icial and 
think in terms of Aristotle's proximate matter and form, 
we may have the dualism of the Scholastics. However, 
we have no right to stop there. We should go back with 
Aristotle to the logical starting point. Thus we are 
obliged to think in terms of pure matter and :f'orm, two 
logical principles of' explanation. It is in this way 
that we avoid entirely any antagonis"Pt between the con-
cepts 'form' and 'matter' for we see described the log-
ical development of' reality :f'rom its possibility. It is 
to be seriously doubted if Aristotle fUrnishes any real 
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basis :ror a hostile matter-:rorn clualism in the shape o:r 
the antagonism o:r mind and matter with its theological 
implications. o:r course it must be conceded that if' one 
ignores the logical emphasis o:r Aristotle and disregards 
his caution regarding matter, such a dualism may be de-
veloped. But it is hardly :rair to claim that it is log-
ically derived :rrom Aristotle rightly interpreted. It 
would seem that scholars like Thomas Aquinas :round in 
Aristotle a convenient terminology that could be accom-
odated to their preconceived system • The logical con-
nection between their systems is quite apt to be more 
apparent than real. 
In our attempt to show that matter and :rorm may be 
reduced we are endeavoring to deny any such dualism in 
Aristotle's thought. Aristotle continues in the idealist 
tradition o:r his master. It does not seem to be neces-
sary to add to what has already been said in this con-
nection. We have seen that :rorm is superior to matter 
in his philosophy. While the concrete is the true re-
ality, we must recognize its ideal nature. The potential 
nature o:r matter and, in its pure :rorm, the :ract that it 
is almost reduced to negation, along with the higher po-
sition attributed to :rorm, lead us to classi:ry him as an 
idealist. His organic view o:r reality is not out o:r 
harmony with the personalistic school. Indeed, undoubt-
edly Personalism owes much to the Philosopher. His sys-
tem is well adapted to a personalistic interpretation. 
Thus we might say with logical consistency that the un-
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moved mover is a person, causing motion, activity, and 
thought on the part of others by being desired. This 
person would be the ground of all reality. Of course 
this would be reacting Personalism into his system upon 
what might be consiclered as insufficient grounds . His 
unmoved Mover seems to be too cold and even impersonal, 
we mi~ht say almost mechanical . It is rather in his 
method that we f'ind the suggestion of' personalistic ten-
dencies . It is perhaps a tribute to his greatness that 
he has been able to transcend what migbt seem a materi-
alistic interpre~ation of reality in the f'ace of the 
line of argument he at times p Ursues. We must confess 
that what seems to us a difficulty in Aristotle's sys-
tem is the absence of' an all-embracing world vie·w. He 
gives us a logical explanation of being based on his 
concept of' cause. Thus we come to an understanding of 
the concrete phenomena . While he shows a necessary re-
lationship between final cause and being, he does not 
give us a very satisfactory interpretation of' his final 
cause. It is due to this f'act that he has been accused 
of a tendency toward mechanism . However , as we have al-
ready shmm, this is unfair. At the same point we have 
also pointed out a weakness in his treatment of' purpose. 
He presupposes purpose as necessary to an adequate explan-
ation of' being. Although he does not make the statement, 
we may infer that purpose is essential to reality. He does 
say, in a passage cited above, that nature, as well as 
intelligence, has a purpose. 
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Aristotle and 1odern Thought 
As we continue our study we are impressed by the 
indebtedness of' modern philosophy to Aristotle. His 
def'inition of' matter as potentiality is suggestive. 
Since potentiality varies so in its signif'ication 
with him, the concept is not entirely satisf'ying. We 
would like to lmow just what relation it would have to 
the concept of' modern physicists? The dynrunic theory 
of' matter would harmonize with his system. Modern 
science is tending toward a view of' matter as energy. 
The atom bas been divided and subdivided and as the pro-
cess continues inf'initely, matter approaches negntion 
in the spatial sense. Modern science is conf'ronted 
with the problem of' reconciling the dynamic conception 
of' matter with the naive. This is analogous to the prob-
lem in Aristotle of' the relation of' prime and proxirrate 
matter. Matter .as energy would be pure and unf'orMed 
but the matter of' which we commonly speak is f'ormed. 
While it would be too much to say that Aristotle was 
a prophet of' modern science, it is interes ting to see 
that his logic is not f'aulty and that his system and 
the f'indings of' modern science are not antagonistic. 
Aristotle is one of' those philosophers whom it is 
aln ost impossible to classif'y. It may be ~ tribute to 
his genius that many opposing schools claim him. It is 
but natural that what is true in one system is e ually 
true in another. What is universally true will be :found 
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in his philosophy in so far as his philosophy is true. 
He furnishes the logical framework for an interpretation 
of reality . He sets for himself the ambitious task of 
studying the nature of being . In his study he collects 
an astonishing number of data . These he has criticised 
with discrimination. But it has not always been easy 
to d i scover his final opinion . In his fairness he states 
the various possible views . At times it is difficult to 
say just what his mm are . He is often more interested 
in his investigations than he is in his inferences . 
We may not blame him because he eludes our labels 
at times . It is partly due to the fact that reality is 
so great and has so many aspects, that men may interpret 
it from many angles . Their findings, while seemingly 
contradictory, may be partially true . In fact, they 
ought to be supplementary . In Aristotle hiJTlsolf we note 
conflicting veins of thought . He seems to take delight 
in paradoxical statement . " In a sense" , seems to be 
one of his favorite expressions . There is the realm of 
the actual and the potential, the universal end the con-
crete, not to mention the logical . His ambition seems 
to be to m ke as many assertions as possible about be-
ing. Thus be directs our attention to many aspects of 
reality . The universe is not simple but confusingly 
complex . 
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Aristotle, in his doctrine o~ cause and s~stem of 
development, has made a major contribution to the rield 
of metaphysics. This alone assures him a lasting place 
in the field o~ philosophy. I~ we Might point out what 
we consider his one chie~ wealmess, it is his ethical 
theory. Truly Lotze's dictum is right. "The true be-
ginning o~ metaphysics is in ethics." Yet Aristotle 
transcends to a renmrl{able degree this de~ect. Per-
haps his ~indings are o~ more value since he interprets 
the world in terms o~ idea and purpose as logically 
necessary, unin~luenced by an ethical theory. Because 
of his empirical method his conclusions can not be min-
imized on the grounds o~ prejudice or bias. Thus his 
system becomes the stronger argument ~or idealism. 
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